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Why do Swedes cooperate with the police?  
A SEM analysis of Tyler’s procedural justice model 
 
Abstract  
The present article examines why Swedes cooperate with the police using the framework of 
the procedural justice theory. This theory assumes that trust in procedural justice and in the 
effectiveness of the police are important issues in shaping citizens’ perceptions of police 
legitimacy. Additionally, perceived legitimacy is necessary for the recognition of police 
authority. When citizens recognize the right of the police to exercise authority, they are 
assumed to feel an obligation to obey the police, and ultimately they will have a greater 
tendency to cooperate with them. Because of the ongoing discussion about the meaning and 
conceptualization of the concept of ‘legitimacy’, some additional ideas are described and are 
also taken into account in the model that we tested. We used structural equation modelling 
(SEM) to do the analysis, which was conducted on data available from the European Social 
Survey (ESS) Round 5. The results indicate that trust in the procedural justice of the police 
plays an important role in the explanation of citizens’ willingness to cooperate with the police 
through perceptions of moral alignment and feelings of obligation to obey the police. 
However, there is still a high percentage of individual variance in willingness to cooperate 
with the police that cannot be explained by the model we tested. The implications of the 
findings are discussed.  
 
Keywords: Trust in the police, cooperation, procedural justice, European Social Survey. 
 
Introduction and research problem 
Trust in modern democracies has long been said to be declining (Catterberg and Moreno 
2005; Nye 1997). This theme has been studied by scholars in the fields of psychology, 
sociology and especially the political sciences. Trust in the institutions of law enforcement is 
at the basis of the democratic political system. Without trust, democracy is at risk, mainly 
because law enforcement loses its legitimacy in the absence of trust. According to Huyse, a 
scholar in the sociology of law, ‘legitimacy and clout’ are the pillars upon which every 
democracy rests. Legitimacy means ‘the conviction, in large sections of the population that 
political institutions and their equipment are worth public trust’. Huyse defines clout as ‘the 
government’s ability to take care of insecurity, work and prosperity’. A long-term weakening 
*BLINDED Manuscript (Without Author Contact Information)
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of one of these pillars may cause the fall of a democracy (Huyse 1996, p.7). Without 
legitimacy, institutions of law enforcement such as the police, the judiciary and the public 
prosecution service risk losing important resources: the willingness of the public to obey them 
and to consider them legitimate might disappear, and young people might lose their 
motivation to apply for jobs in law enforcement (Tyler 2006a, 2007, 2011). Furthermore, the 
willingness of the public to comply with the law might decrease when the institutions of law 
enforcement are distrusted (Nye 1997). The central idea that lies behind this study is that if 
people trust the criminal justice system, they will regard it as a form of legitimate authority; 
they will then defer to this authority, obey the law, and in consequence cooperate with the 
justice system (Hough et al. 2010; Jackson et al. 2012). The aim of this article is to test this 
idea to see if it explains why Swedes are willing to cooperate with the police, who are part of 
the criminal justice system.   
The present study draws on insights gained from Tyler’s procedural justice model; this 
has primarily been explored in English-speaking cultures, but has not yet been sufficiently 
tested in the varied cultural settings of continental and Northern Europe. For that reason, a 
common criticism of the procedural justice model is that it has most frequently been applied 
in English-speaking countries with common law legal systems that are substantially different 
from the continental legal systems (Hough et al. 2010; Reisig, Tankebe & Mesko 2013). A 
significant question is therefore whether this theoretical framework can be applied in other 
contexts, such as Northern Europe, where the legal systems and the position of the police 
within them are often very different (although in all countries both these institutions want to 
be perceived as legitimate). This question is of particular relevance given the ever-increasing 
pluralism and mobility of the modern world. That consideration apart, it is also essential to 
test the scope of theories. A theory cannot pretend to be the final, certain truth. A theory can 
be corroborated, and should be retained provisionally as the best available theory only until it 
is shown to be false (Popper 1959). This study is of practical as well as theoretical relevance. 
A test of procedural justice theory in the Swedish context could offer a contribution to the 
further development of policing strategies. As Tankebe (2009) noticed, studies in which a 
theory is re-tested enable us to learn about the differences and similarities between societies. 
On the one hand, similar societies can copy ideas or policy innovations from each other; on 
the other hand, studies like these can help to avoid the ‘blind’ transportation of strategies from 
one social context to another.  
Before taking a closer look at the results of the theory test, we will sketch out the 
theoretical framework of this study. We also consider the ongoing discussion about the 
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meaning and conceptualization of the concept of ‘legitimacy’, which is a key concept within 
procedural justice theory. In the next paragraph we highlight some earlier studies on trust in 
Sweden. We also consider some studies in which the role of procedural justice was tested to 
explain the willingness of people to cooperate with the police. The theoretical framework and 
the different views of the conceptualization of legitimacy have led to a testable path model to 
explain the willingness of the public to cooperate with the police. The analysis is based on the 
most recent edition of the European Social Survey (ESS 2010). The testable path model led us 
to specific hypotheses that are described in detail below, and we follow these by a description 
of the data and of the operationalization of the concepts. After a brief explanation of the 
method used in the study, the results of the test are shown. We end with a conclusion and 
discussion.  
 
Can the attitudes and behaviour of citizens be shaped by the actions of legal authorities?  
According to procedural justice theory, which was extensively developed by Tom Tyler 
(1988) and provided with an empirical basis by Thibaut and Walker (1975), public trust in the 
criminal justice system depends on perceptions of procedural fairness or justice on the one 
hand and perceptions of effectiveness on the other (Benesh and Howell 2001; Hough et al. 
2013a, 2013b; Jackson et al. 2012; Sunshine and Tyler 2003a, 2003b; Thibaut and Walker 
1975; Tyler 2006a). With regard to the police, public trust may be affected by the extent to 
which the police are able to treat people fairly and to fight crime and disorder effectively. In 
several publications, Tyler (2003, 2006a, 2007, 2011) has shown that perceived procedural 
justice is more important in shaping public trust than perceived effectiveness. Fair and 
respectful treatment that ‘follows the rules’ is thus more important to citizens than obtaining 
outcomes that they regard as either fair or favourable to themselves (Hough et al. 2010). In 
general, there are two criteria for judging the fairness of the procedures that are used by the 
legal authorities: (1) the quality of decision-making and (2) the quality of the personal 
treatment one receives. First, citizens want to feel that authorities handle their questions 
and/or problems honestly, without bias, and objectively. A citizen wants to be treated and 
helped in the same way as any other individual in the same situation. Neutrality has to be 
central in the process of decision-making. Second, citizens want to be treated with dignity and 
respect, regardless of whether their role is that of victim, suspect or witness. They want 
respect for their rights and for their position within society. Lastly, in relation to both these 
criteria, Tyler and Fagan (2008) argued that it is important for citizens to have the opportunity 
to explain their views and behaviour before the police take decisions. They want to participate 
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actively in discussions during the decision-making process. If an individual believes that an 
authority has attempted to be fair to him/her, has treated him/her with dignity and respect and 
has dealt with him/her in an impartial manner, the feelings of fairness will be enhanced 
(Murphy 2003, 2005). Public trust in the police is thus based on perceptions of police activity, 
but police activity itself also depends on public trust. In fact, public trust enhances the 
perception of police legitimacy. When citizens perceive the police to be legitimate, it means 
that the legal authority of the police is accepted. This results in the public being willing to 
obey the police, to comply with the law and even to cooperate with the police in dealing with 
crime and criminality. If an individual is not willing to testify, report a crime, comply with the 
law or obey the police, not only is the belief that the police are worthy of public trust put at 
risk, but public safety is also affected. Therefore, it is the responsibility of the government and 
the legal authorities to gain public trust (Van Damme 2013). 
 
The concept of ‘legitimacy’ 
Tyler (1997) has specifically shown that individuals who feel they have been fairly treated by 
the authorities view those authorities as having legitimate power. But what does legitimacy 
mean? Because of the ongoing discussion about the meaning and conceptualization of this 
‘slippery’ concept, Hough, Jackson and Bradford (2013b) tried to answer this question. First 
of all, in line with Hinsch (2010) they made a distinction between normative and empirical 
legitimacy. Normative legitimacy exists when authorities meet various agreed objective 
criteria, like the absence of corruption. However, empirical legitimacy is based on citizens’ 
perceptions. In this case it does not matter whether institutions meet objective criteria, as only 
the public perception of legitimacy matters. In this respect, it is possible to have a system of 
policing that commands high levels of perceived legitimacy from the policed citizens whilst 
also, paradoxically, failing to meet the criteria of legitimacy that would generally be accepted 
in a democratic society. Cultural and historical reasons can be at the basis of the different 
orientations of populations to authorities (Hough et al. 2013b). Only an institution that 
commands high levels of empirical (or perceived) legitimacy can count on public support 
(Hough 2010).
1
 Hough and his colleagues defined empirical legitimacy as ‘the recognition 
and justification of the right to exercise power and influence’ (Hough et al. 2013b, p.1). This 
definition is in line with that of Beetham, who defined legitimacy as ‘the right to rule and the 
recognition by the ruled of that right’ (Beetham 1991; Jackson et al. 2012; Tyler 2006b). 
                                                          
1
 The focus of our study is on perceptions of legitimacy. Thus, when we use the term ‘legitimacy’ without an 
adjective, we refer to empirical or perceived legitimacy. 
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Thus, a legitimate authority means not only that citizens recognize the existence of this 
authority and the right of this authority to command respect and use force (Tyler 2006a, 
2006b), but also that the power of this authority is justified (Jackson et al. 2012). With regard 
to the police, this means that a police force that is regarded as legitimate has an entitlement to 
command and use force when laws are not followed, and this entitlement is recognized by the 
public. The justification of police power is based on the perception that the police and public 
share similar values and norms and that the police act according to the law. Following this 
idea about the meaning of legitimacy, Hough et al. (2013b) conceptualized empirical 
legitimacy as having three subcomponents, namely obligation to obey, legality and moral 
alignment. Feeling the obligation to obey refers to the recognition by the public of police 
power, and can be seen as a behavioural component of legitimacy. Because of the respect 
citizens have for the police as a legitimate authority, they will voluntarily obey them (Hinds 
and Murphy 2007). In other words, people see it as their duty to obey the police even when 
they disagree with the police or dislike how they act. Legality and moral alignment refer to 
the justification of police power. These components can be seen as the grounds on which the 
consent of citizens to defer to the police is built (Hough et al. 2013b). If (1) people believe 
that the police act according to the law (legality), (2) people believe that the police share the 
same sense of right and wrong, values and norms as they do (moral alignment), and (3) 
people feel a positive duty to obey the instructions of police officers (obligation to obey), then 
people will see the police as legitimate authorities (Hough et al. 2013b).  
Tankebe (2013) and Bottoms and Tankebe (2012) have taken a slightly different 
approach. They argue that legitimacy has a dialogic character in which power-holders make 
claims, power-subjects respond, power-holders then perhaps adjust their claims and so on. 
They believe that these dialogues can take different forms in different societies, and that the 
dimensions of legitimacy can thus vary in different socio-political settings (Tankebe 2013). 
According to Tankebe (2013), effectiveness, distributive fairness, procedural fairness and 
lawfulness are likely to be some of the main contents of the dimensions of police legitimacy 
in a liberal democracy. Effectiveness, distributive fairness and procedural fairness have to be 
seen as specific shared values and beliefs, and the law is an expression of recognized and 
accepted values within a democratic society. This conceptualization thus also draws on 
Beetham’s (1991) idea that legitimacy contains the notions of legality and shared values. 
According to Tankebe (2013), police officers will be perceived as legitimate when people 
believe that the police: (1) are able to fight crime and disorder effectively (effectiveness); (2) 
act fairly, neutrally and respectfully (procedural fairness); (3) deal with all kinds of people 
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(rich and poor, people from different ethnic groups, people with different sexual orientations) 
in the same way (distributive fairness); and (4) act according to the law (lawfulness). On the 
one hand this conceptualization is in line with Tyler’s original work in which legitimacy was 
measured by perceived obligation to obey the law and trust in or support for legal authorities 
(Tyler and Fagan 2008). In this respect, effectiveness, distributive fairness and procedural 
fairness can be seen as components of trust in, or support for, legal authorities, although 
Tankebe does not use the word ‘trust’. On the other hand, Tankebe (2013) argues that an 
obligation to obey theoretically differs from legitimacy, which he believes is a much wider 
concept. According to Tankebe, feeling the obligation to obey can be considered as a 
dependent variable that can be explained not just by citizens’ recognition of police power as 
normatively valid (perceived legitimacy), but also by other variables such as fear of the costs 
of non-obedience or a feeling of powerlessness. Feeling the obligation to obey the police is 
thus considered to be an outcome, not a constituent of perceived legitimacy in Tankebe’s 
framework (Hough et al. 2013b). This is also one of the major points of difference between 
Tankebe’s framework and the framework of Hough, Jackson and colleagues. Another 
different point of view is shown in their conceptualizations of the notion of shared values. 
Tankebe (2013) believes that the concept of moral alignment, which is used in the framework 
of Hough, Jackson and colleagues, is too general and vague. He believes that it is possible, 
depending on the particular society, to identify specific values that are shared between police 
and citizens. He therefore identifies procedural justice, distributive justice and effectiveness as 
examples of shared values in a liberal-democratic society. Hough, Jackson and colleagues 
also used the concepts of procedural justice, distributive justice and effectiveness, not as 
specific values, but as dimensions of trust. As we have already mentioned, public trust in the 
police can be considered as a determinant of perceived legitimacy, not as a constituent of it.  
In this study, following the framework of Hough, Jackson and colleagues, we also 
consider trust in police procedural justice and trust in police effectiveness as a means, and 
perceived legitimacy as an end. In other words, public trust in the police depends on how the 
police act, and these feelings of trust will affect perceptions of police legitimacy. But we are 
also aware of Tankebe’s argument that an obligation to obey is theoretically different from 
perceived legitimacy. We also believe that feeling obliged to obey the police can, among 
other possible explanations, be the result of a citizen’s belief that police power is justified 
because the police act legally and according to the main shared values that exist within 
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society. Why should one feel obliged to obey the police? One of the possible answers is 
because one simply believes that the police are legitimate.
2
  
Several scholars have found an association between, on the one hand, perceptions of 
police legitimacy and, on the other hand, different forms of public support for the police such 
as the willingness to cooperate with the police (e.g. Hough et al. 2010; Jackson et al. 2012; 
Murphy 2009; Murphy and Cherney 2012; Reisig and Lloyd 2009; Reisig et al. 2007; Tyler 
2006a; Tyler and Fagan 2008; Tyler and Huo 2002). Because of the different approaches that 
exist, we have analysed a model for the explanation of the willingness of Swedes to cooperate 
with the police (see Figure 3) which is a combination of Tankebe’s (see Figure 1) and Hough, 
Jackson and colleagues’ (see Figure 2) frameworks. We have not taken distributive justice 
into account as a component of trust in the police because we believe that distributive justice 
is closely related to procedural justice. Handling all kinds of people in the same way can also 
be considered as fair handling. However, we are aware that procedural and distributive justice 
can be conceptually and practically distinguished.  
 
Fig.1 Possible paths to cooperation, Tankebe’s approach 
 
                                                          
2
 In the ESS ‘obligation to obey’ was measured by three items beginning with: ‘To what extent is it your duty 
to…’ Duty can be interpreted in different ways, which is why interviewers were given an instruction to clarify 
‘duty’ as meaning ‘duty’ in the sense of citizens’ moral duty to the state, when people asked. In a way, this could 
counter Tankebe’s arguments, but we believe that the instruction given to the interviewers was not strong 
enough. Not everyone asks for clarification of ‘duty’. If we only look at the question referring to ‘obligation to 
obey’, which is translated very well in the Swedish questionnaire, we do have to take Tankebe’s argument into 
account. 
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Fig.2 Possible paths to cooperation, Hough, Jackson and colleagues’ approach 
 
Fig.3 Possible paths to cooperation, our approach  
 
Previous studies on trust in Sweden 
Public trust in the institutions of law enforcement such as the police force is generally quite 
high in Sweden. Compared with the citizens of other countries, Swedes are often glad to 
report a crime to the police (Van Dijk et al. 2007). Several researchers have sought 
explanations for the high levels of trust in institutions in the Scandinavian countries. Some of 
them have associated the high levels in these countries with the Human Development Index, 
which is an indicator of a good standard of living, with higher levels of trust. Others have 
found a positive direct effect of ethnic homogeneity and Protestantism on trust, and this could 
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explain the higher level of trust in Scandinavia (Delhey and Newton 2005). Lappi-Seppälä 
(2008) linked the lower levels of detention (and the lower crime level) and lower levels of 
fear of crime in Scandinavian countries with these higher levels of trust. Since 2006, large-
scale surveys by the National Council for Crime Prevention have been conducted regularly in 
Sweden. In these surveys, a number of questions are asked about individuals’ trust in the 
institutions of law enforcement (Brå 2012). In 2011, about two-thirds (64%) of the 
respondents reported a high level of trust in the institutions of law enforcement. Moreover, 
there seems to have been a slight increase in trust over time. Of all the public authorities, the 
police are the most trusted. The Swedish Prison and Probation Service seems to be least 
trusted by the public. In general, it seems that authorities that the public are more familiar 
with are more trusted. The police are more visible on the streets and are therefore easily 
accessible (Bradford et al. 2009). When citizens experience problems, they find it natural to 
ask the police for help. Public trust in the police is built by (in)direct contact or just because 
the police are visible; by contrast, most Swedish citizens never have contact with the Swedish 
Prison and Probation Service. Van de Walle (2005) also argued that differences in the degree 
of trust in institutions of criminal justice arise from the nature and people’s appreciation of the 
product delivered by the specific institution. The courts, for instance, will usually be 
associated with punishment, whereas the police fulfil a double role, on the one hand ‘rescuer 
in case of emergency’ and on the other hand ‘law enforcer’ (Van Damme et al. 2010). 
Previous studies in Sweden on the trust in law enforcement agencies are largely descriptive, 
and no Swedish study has so far explored why people are willing to cooperate with the police.  
 
Recent studies on procedural justice to explain public cooperation with the police 
Most of the studies in which procedural justice theory has been tested have focused on 
compliance as the ultimate dependent variable (e.g. Jackson et al. 2012; Murphy 2003, 2005; 
Tyler 2006a). This can be explained by saying that procedural justice theory can be seen as an 
answer to deterrence models. According to deterrence models, crime, or non-compliance, can 
be explained through the idea that people are rational economic creatures who make a cost-
benefit analysis before considering breaking the law. When the benefits – the advantages from 
committing a crime – are greater than the cost – the risk of (harsh) punishment – people will 
commit crime (Matsueda et al. 2006; Paternoster 2010; Pauwels et al. 2011). Some 
criminologists recognize that it is not only instrumental motivations that can explain why 
people obey the law, but also normative motivations. This normative approach assumes that 
people comply with the law, not because of the fear of being punished, but because they 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
10 
 
believe it is the right thing to do and they feel morally obliged to do it (Jackson et al. 2012, 
Tyler 2006a, Tyler and Huo 2002). This is called a ‘process-based model’ because 
compliance is considered to be a result of perceived police legitimacy that is based on 
citizens’ perceptions about police functioning, or more precisely about their procedurally just 
and effective behaviour (Tankebe 2009). The same approach has been used by several 
researchers to explain why people are willing to cooperate with the police (Bradford 2012; 
Bradford and Jackson 2010; Hough et al. 2013b; Huq et al. 2011; Murphy et al. 2008; Myhill 
and Quinton 2011; Sunshine and Tyler 2003b; Tankebe 2009, 2013; Tyler 2004; Tyler and 
Fagan 2008; Van Damme 2013). Most of these studies have found that perceptions of police 
legitimacy positively affect people’s willingness to cooperate with the police, and that 
perceived police legitimacy itself is mostly shaped by perceptions about police procedural 
justice (Bradford 2012; Hough et al. 2013b; Huq et al. 2011; Murphy et al. 2008; Myhill and 
Quinton 2011; Sunshine and Tyler 2003b; Tyler 2004; Tyler and Fagan 2008). In what 
follows we describe some recent studies in which a slightly different approach
3
 was used 
and/or different results were obtained. We only highlight the results that are relevant to this 
study. 
In their research, Tyler and Fagan (2008) examined whether the perceptions of the 
residents of New York City about police legitimacy, in the form of obligation to obey, trust 
and confidence in the police and identification with the police, shape two specific forms of 
cooperative behaviour; more precisely, these are not only cooperation with the police in their 
response to crime but also cooperation with neighbours to maintain social order within the 
community. They found an effect of perceived legitimacy on citizens’ willingness to 
cooperate with the police. They measured this by asking the respondents how likely they 
would be to call the police to report a crime, to help the police find someone suspected of a 
crime or to report dangerous or suspicious activity. Cooperation with neighbours was 
measured by asking the respondents how likely they would be to volunteer time to help the 
police, to patrol the streets with others or to attend community police meetings about crime. 
Tyler and Fagan found that only the perceptions about legitimacy of people of ethnic 
minorities had an effect, but the perceptions of white people had no effect. Perceived 
legitimacy itself was found to be linked to perceptions of police procedural justice, which is in 
line with most procedural justice studies. Similar results were found in the study by Van 
Damme (2013). In this study the procedural justice model was tested on the Belgian ESS data 
                                                          
3
 These differ mostly in the operationalization of cooperation with the police and/or legitimacy.  
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to explain the willingness of the public to cooperate with the police, in the form of their 
willingness to call the police when a crime occurred, to identify a suspect and to give 
evidence in court against the accused. The results show that procedural justice seemed to be 
the most important factor in the explanation of both the obligation to obey the police and 
moral alignment as the dimensions of perceived legitimacy. But only moral alignment with 
the police seemed to have an influence on the willingness of Belgians to cooperate with the 
police. No empirical support was found for the effect of feeling an obligation to obey. Thus, 
in Belgium, the perception of whether or not people are treated honestly and with respect by 
the police is very important in feeling morally aligned with the police. This feeling that police 
and citizens share the same values and norms is in turn of significant importance for the 
willingness of the public to report a crime or identify a suspect. In their UK study, Myhill and 
Quinton (2011) also found that the most important factor for the explanation of cooperation 
with the police (such as, for example, reporting a crime or suspicious activity) was perceived 
police legitimacy, but legitimacy was only measured in the form of shared values between the 
police and the public. Also in this study, legitimacy, or more correctly the feeling that police 
and citizens share the same values, was itself particularly shaped by perceptions about police 
fairness, and not by perceptions about police effectiveness. Likewise, Murphy, Hinds and 
Fleming (2008) found in their Australian study that people who believed the police to be more 
legitimate were more willing to assist them. The key antecedent of perceived legitimacy also 
seemed to be procedural justice, although the operationalization of perceived police 
legitimacy was not in line with most of the earlier studies.
4
 Police legitimacy was measured 
here by asking citizens about their level of respect for the police, how much confidence they 
had in the police, and how well they thought the police did their job and performed in a 
professional manner. The element of shared values, which is one of the key notions of the 
concept of legitimacy, was not taken into account here. Furthermore, the last two components 
are more related to police performance or effectiveness. But expanding further on this point 
would lead us again to the ongoing discussion about the concept of legitimacy. Moreover, in 
their London study Bradford and Jackson (2010) did not measure legitimacy directly as earlier 
researchers did, but they had data on cooperation and trust in both police effectiveness and 
police procedural justice. In this respect, they had assessed the direct effects of trust on 
cooperation rather than the indirect effects through perceived legitimacy. They found that 
people were not only more willing to cooperate with the police if they thought the police act 
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 Most studies use shared values and/or obligation to obey and/or legality and/or trust to measure the concept of 
legitimacy.  
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fairly, but also if they perceived the police to be effective in fighting crime. In his study, 
Tankebe (2009) tested Tyler’s procedural justice model in the Ghanaian context. He did not 
find a significant association between procedural fairness and cooperation with the police. On 
the contrary, perceptions about police effectiveness in fighting crime seemed to shape public 
cooperation with the police. These results are not in line with the previously-mentioned 
studies in which procedural justice seemed to play the most important role. Tankebe has thus 
shown that findings can differ when the procedural justice theory is tested in different 
societies. The reason why these results differ from earlier studies can be found in the history 
of policing in Ghana. During colonial and military rule, policing in Ghana was characterized 
by abuse, violence, intimidation and widespread corruption. These abuses have led to a deficit 
in police legitimation, and the alienation of the public from the police in Ghana. Tankebe 
therefore argued that policing in societies such as Ghana has to focus on performance. In this 
respect, the police have to make it clear that they are effective in fighting crime and that they 
are able to provide security to the public. Only when citizens believe that the police are able 
to do their work will they have a greater tendency to call the police to report a crime or 
suspicious activities or to help the police with information on a suspect or a crime.  
Considering this overview, in most of the societies in which the procedural justice 
theory is tested, acting in a procedurally just way is thus important in order for police officers 
to encourage members of the public to cooperate in combating crime. But, as Tankebe (2009) 
has proved, different results can be found in different societies. The aim of this study is 
therefore to test the procedural justice theory in the Swedish context.  
 
Current focus 
Figure 4 specifies a number of routes leading to cooperation with the police which are tested 
in the current study. The basic idea is to gain insight into the magnitude of the direct effects of 
all exogenous variables on all endogenous variables. The exogenous variables are trust in 
police procedural justice and trust in police effectiveness. Moral alignment, feeling an 
obligation to obey the police and cooperation are treated as endogenous variables. 
Cooperation is the ultimate dependent variable in the present study. As we have already 
mentioned, the model has been inspired by previous studies (especially those of Hough et al. 
2010; Jackson et al. 2012; Tankebe 2009). We have not taken perceived legality of the police 
into account as a dimension of perceived police legitimacy, because we do not believe that the 
ESS dataset contains a useful operationalization of this dimension. For the ESS data 
collection, people were questioned about how often they would say that the police in their 
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country took bribes. Hough et al. (2013b) consider this question to be the legality dimension 
of legitimacy. We believe that this question refers to the level of corruption of the police. It is 
not because people believe the police are not corrupt that they also believe that the police 
always act according to the law. Taking bribes is only one aspect of non-legal behaviour.  
 
Fig.4 Testable path model   
 
This article aims to test the procedural justice theory to explain Swedes’ willingness to 
cooperate with the police, and Figure 4 visualizes possible paths in our approach.  
The following hypotheses can be distilled: 
H1.  Perceived police legitimacy in the form of moral alignment with the police can 
be explained by trust in police procedural justice and trust in police effectiveness.  
H1a.  Relative to police effectiveness, the effect of procedural justice on moral 
alignment will be stronger.  
 
H2.  Feeling obliged to obey the police can be explained by feeling morally aligned 
with the police.  
H2a.  Considering Hypothesis 1, there will be an effect of trust in the police, through 
moral alignment, on feeling an obligation to obey the police.  
 
H3.  The willingness of Swedes to cooperate with the police can be explained by 
their feeling obliged to obey the police.  
H3a.  Considering Hypotheses 1 and 2, there will be an effect of trust in the police, 
through moral alignment and the feeling of obligation to obey the police.  
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Data 
The European Social Survey is a repeated international cross-sectional survey covering over 
30 European countries. The ESS survey (Round 5) is funded jointly by the European 
Commission’s Fifth Framework Programme, the European Science Foundation and academic 
funding bodies in each participating country. The survey is designed and carried out to 
exceptionally high standards. The ESS aims to monitor changing public attitudes and values 
within Europe, to investigate how they interact with Europe’s changing institutions, and to 
advance and consolidate improved methods of cross-national survey measurement in Europe 
and beyond. The survey involves strict random probability sampling, a minimum target 
response rate of 70% and rigorous translation protocols. The ESS survey is conducted by 
means of face-to-face interviews that take about one hour and include (amongst others) 
questions on immigration, citizenship and social and political issues. Only those aged 15 or 
older who are resident within private households are questioned, regardless of their 
nationality, language or (il)legal status. For this study we extracted the sample taken in 
Sweden. The sample contained 1157 respondents. The age of the respondents ranged from 15 
to 95 with a mean of 49 years. Almost the same numbers of men and women were questioned. 
Twenty per cent of the respondents reported having an immigrant background.
5
 In order to 
obtain a sample with a comparable social composition to that of the population we performed 
the analyses with the prescribed weighting procedure (Jowell and the Central Co-ordinating 
Team 2003; ESS 2010). 
 
Measures 
To make abstract concepts tangible or measurable, they need to be operationalized. This is 
required for the translation of a theoretical model into empirical terms and relations (Billiet 
1996). In the European Social Survey, Likert scales were used for the measurement of 
attitudes toward the police, so that abstract concepts were measured by well-considered sets 
of items (Pauwels 2012). These items or indicators were questions or statements that had to be 
answered in the survey. The validity of every scale was tested by estimating Cronbach’s 
alpha.
6
 A frequent criticism of secondary data is that the researcher cannot choose the 
                                                          
5
 A table with the background characteristics of the respondents in the Swedish sample can be found in the 
Appendix.  
6
 Cronbach’s alpha is a coefficient of internal consistency. All items have to measure the same concept. A value 
of less than 0.80 indicates little consistency between the items. In practice, values of 0.60 or higher are 
acceptable (Baarda and De Goede 1995; Pauwels 2012). 
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operationalization of the concepts. However, the trust module developed for the ESS was 
carefully prepared. A multidisciplinary team of researchers, the Euro-Justis team, was 
responsible for this module.
7
 On the basis of a well-considered theoretical framework, 
questions were developed for the trust module. Pilot surveys in Bulgaria and the United 
Kingdom tested the quality of the module. Attention was paid to the wording of the questions, 
the expected relationships between the variables, the identification of the best indicators and 
the time needed to answer the questions (Jackson et al. 2011). Eventually only the 45 best 
indicators were selected. Although we are limited in this study by the content of the ESS, the 
operationalizations are nevertheless of high quality (although we have already mentioned the 
limited operationalization of legality). In the following paragraph we describe the 
operationalizations of the concepts used in this study.  
Trust in the procedural justice or fairness of the police was measured by a summated 
Likert scale of three items concerning the quality of citizens’ treatment by the police and the 
quality of decision-making by the police. These three items were: ‘Based on what you have 
heard or your own experience, how often would you say the police treat people in Sweden 
with respect?’ (D15), ‘About how often would you say that the police make fair, impartial 
decisions in the cases they deal with?’ (D16), and ‘When dealing with people in Sweden, how 
often would you say the police generally explain their decisions and actions when asked to do 
so?’ (D17). Each time four answer categories were offered ranging from not at all often to 
very often. High scores on the scale reflect a high level of perceived procedural fairness. 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.64). 
The perception of trust in the effectiveness of the police was also measured by a 
summated Likert scale consisting of two items:
8
 ‘Based on what you have heard or your own 
experience, how successful do you think the police are at preventing crimes in Sweden where 
violence is used or threatened?’ (D12) and ‘How successful do you think the police are at 
catching people who commit house burglaries in Sweden?’ (D13). People had to answer on a 
10-point scale on a range from 0, extremely unsuccessful to 10, extremely successful. A high 
score on this scale indicates high trust in the effectiveness of the police.  
For the operationalization of perceived police legitimacy only a moral dimension 
(moral alignment with the police) was taken into account. Jackson et al. (2012) also 
considered a behavioural dimension (obligation to obey the police). Although the two 
                                                          
7
 More information about Euro-Justis can be found on the following website: http://www.eurojustis.eu 
8
 Originally three items were available in the data set, but the third item (‘How quickly would police arrive at a 
violent crime scene near to where you live?’) was omitted because it seriously affected the reliability scores. 
When the item was included, Cronbach’s alpha score was low at 0.57. 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
16 
 
summated Likert scales are related, exploratory factor analysis showed that the two 
dimensions are empirically different. Following Tankebe’s arguments (2009), we also 
distinguished feeling the obligation to obey the police from perceptions about police 
legitimacy. In this respect, moral alignment with the police was measured by the following 
items: ‘The police generally have the same sense of right and wrong as I do’ (D21), ‘The 
police stand up for values that are important to people like me’ (D22) and ‘I generally support 
how the police usually act’ (D23). Respondents were asked to score the extent to which they 
agreed with these statements on a range from 1, agree strongly to 5, disagree strongly. Items 
on this scale were recoded and a high score refers to a high level of moral alignment with the 
police (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.74).  
Obligation to obey the police was measured by the following three items: ‘To what 
extent is it your duty to...:’ ‘...back the decisions made by the police even when you disagree 
with them?’ (D18), ‘...do what the police tell you even if you don’t understand or agree with 
the reasons?’ (D19), ‘...do what the police tell you to do, even if you don’t like how they treat 
you?’ (D20). People were asked to answer on a 10-point scale on a range from 0, not my duty 
at all to 10, completely my duty. High scores on the scale reflect a strong feeling of obligation 
to obey the police (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79). 
A summated scale was used to measure the willingness of the respondents to 
cooperate with the police. Respondents had to answer several questions about what they 
would do if they witnessed a crime. More precisely, they were asked: ‘Imagine that you were 
out and saw someone push a man to the ground and steal his wallet. How likely would you be 
to call the police?’ (D40; with responses ranging from 1 = not at all likely to 4 = very likely; 
D40), ‘How willing would you be to identify the person who had done it?’ (D 41; with 
responses ranging from 1 = not at all willing to 4 = very willing) and ‘How willing would you 
be to give evidence in court against the accused?’ (D42; with responses also ranging from 1 = 
not at all willing to 4 = very willing). High scores on this scale refer indicate great willingness 
to cooperate with the police (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.77).  
 
Analytical strategy 
To test the hypotheses, we used structural equation modelling (SEM). SEM offers the 
opportunity to explore the extent to which a specific theoretical model can explain the 
relations between the observed variables. Structural equation models consist of a 
measurement model and a structural model. In the measurement model the relations between 
the observed and the latent variables are specified. In the study in hand, the factor analytical 
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constructed variables from Tyler’s theory are the latent variables. The variables or items used 
in a factor analysis need to fulfil certain conditions otherwise the factor analysis is not 
meaningful. First, the variables need to be measured at least at interval level. Second, the 
number of respondents has to be satisfactory (rule of thumb: preferably at least ten times as 
many respondents as variables). Third, the sample must not be homogeneous (or the factor 
analysis does not provide clear factors), but at the same time, the sample must not consist of 
several subgroups (or the different factor structures will flow through each other).  
All analyses were carried out with LISREL 8.53 (Jöreskog and Sörbom 2003). The 
models presented in this paper show standardized factor solutions, and for the evaluation and 
fit of the models the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is preferred over the 
chi-square value because large samples inevitably tend to result in large chi-square values and 
therefore in a negative evaluation of the model fit. As the RMSEA is least affected by the 
sample size, it is a good measure of close fit (Mueller 1996). RMSEA values below 0.05 are 
considered acceptable (Billiet and McClendon 2000).  
Because all ‘attitude item sets’ are ordinal, we used weighted least squares (WLS) 
estimations which are based on polychoric correlations and an asymptotic covariance matrix.
9
  
 
Results of the structural equation model 
The theoretical path model of Figure 4 was tested. Figure 5 depicts the results of the statistical 
model that fits best with the data.  
 
Fig.5 Results – Path model for the explanation of cooperation with the police in Sweden 
                                                          
9
 Although WLS estimations should be used if some or all of the observed variables are ordinal or discrete, and 
maximum likelihood (ML) estimations in the case of normally distributed variables, the choice between the two 
is not as straightforward as it seems. Jöreskog and Sörbom state that ‘if the sample size is not sufficiently large to 
produce an accurate estimate of the asymptotic covariance matrix, it is probably better to use ML or GLS 
(generalized least squares)’ (1989, p.223). Although a ‘sufficiently large sample’ is a relative notion, the survey 
used in this contribution has a large number of observations combined with only a few variables, so we think 
WLS estimations are an appropriate choice. 
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Chi-square = 133.14, df = 73, p-value = 0.000, RMSEA = 0.027 
Several models were run to test the relationships between the exogenous variables trust in 
police procedural fairness and trust in police effectiveness on the one hand, and the 
endogenous variables moral alignment, feeling the obligation to obey the police and 
willingness to cooperate with the police on the other. We expected that moral alignment with 
the police would be explained by trust in police effectiveness and procedural fairness, and that 
moral alignment is the key mediator in explaining a feeling of obligation to obey the police 
and willingness to cooperate with the police, whereas we expected obligation to obey to have 
a direct impact on cooperation.  
 The Swedish data is in line with most procedural justice studies. We found strong 
evidence that trust in procedural justice is a key mechanism for explaining individual 
differences in perceived police legitimacy in the form of moral alignment. Swedes who more 
strongly perceived the police to be fair and respectful showed that they felt more morally 
aligned with the police. They believed, more than other Swedes, that the police stand up for 
values that are important to people like them and that the police generally have the same sense 
of right and wrong as they do, and they also indicated a greater level of support for how the 
police usually act. The findings show also a positive but less strong effect of trust in police 
effectiveness on moral alignment. This means that people who perceived the police to be 
successful at preventing crimes and catching suspects also felt more morally aligned with the 
police. But in this respect the effect of trust in police procedural justice (0.67) is far stronger 
than the effect of trust in police effectiveness (0.18). The results thus endorse our first 
hypothesis (H1 and H1a). Forty-four per cent of the individual variances in moral alignment 
are explained by trust in procedural justice and trust in police effectiveness. This is rather 
high. Only 56% of the individual variances in moral alignment can be explained by other 
variables that are not included in the model.  
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 Our second hypothesis (H2 and H2a) is also endorsed. The results show a positive, 
moderate effect of moral alignment on feeling an obligation to obey (0.45). Those with a 
greater belief that police and citizens share the same values and norms feel more obliged to do 
what the police tell them to do. The explained individual variance of feeling an obligation to 
obey the police is 21%. This means that 79% of the individual variances cannot be explained 
by our model. Because of the ongoing discussion about the operationalization of the concept 
of legitimacy, we also analysed a path model based on the approach of Hough, Jackson and 
colleagues (see the Figure in the Appendix). The value of the RMSEA (0.026) shows that the 
model fit is similar to the one in our approach (RMSEA = 0.027). Both models are thus 
satisfactory. This means that the statistics do not give an answer to the question of how 
legitimacy should be measured. The discussion on the concept of legitimacy is thus a 
discussion of substance. However, looking at the results obtained from Hough, Jackson and 
colleagues’ approach, trust in police effectiveness was not found to have any direct effect on 
feeling an obligation to obey the police. This means that perceptions about how effectively the 
police perform their job do not directly influence a feeling that one is obliged to do what the 
police tell one to do.  
 Lastly, our third hypothesis (H3 and H3a) is also endorsed. The results in Figure 5 
show a positive but modest effect (0.17) of feeling an obligation to obey the police on 
willingness to cooperate with the police. In other words, respondents who indicated a stronger 
feeling of obligation to obey also indicated a greater tendency to report a crime, to identify a 
suspect or to give evidence in court. Only 3% of the individual differences in Swedes’ 
willingness to cooperate with the police is explained by the model. Thus, 97% of the 
individual differences are due to other variables. 
If we evaluate the structural equation model in total, procedural justice theory has 
received empirical support, although there are a high percentage of the individual differences 
in willingness to cooperate with the police that cannot be explained by our model. Adding 
legality as a dimension of legitimacy could probably explain a little more. However, we 
believe that there are many other possible explanations, such as an individual’s personal 
morality.    
 
Conclusion and discussion 
According to the procedural justice perspective, people consider the police to be a legitimate 
authority when police officers act in a procedurally just and effective manner. Furthermore, it 
is the perception of police legitimacy that encourages people to cooperate with the police. But 
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what do the data say about this theory applied to the context of Sweden? The findings are in 
line with the theory and with most of the earlier studies. Trust in police procedural justice 
does indeed seem to be a very strong predictor of moral alignment as a dimension of 
perceived police legitimacy, and trust in police effectiveness is a weaker predictor. Following 
Tankebe’s arguments (2009), we also considered whether feeling an obligation to obey the 
police is a possible outcome of perceived legitimacy. In this respect, moral alignment itself 
seems to have a positive effect on feeling an obligation to obey the police. This therefore 
means that it is necessary for the Swedish police to treat citizens fairly and respectfully, so 
that citizens perceive the police as legitimate, or, more precisely, so that citizens believe that 
they and the police share the same values and norms. This is of paramount importance, 
because the feeling that police and citizens are on the same side influences attitudes towards 
the police in the form of feeling an obligation to obey them. Trust in police procedural justice 
even leads to a greater willingness to cooperate with the police through moral alignment and 
feeling an obligation to obey the police, which means that the effectiveness of the police also 
depends on public trust, although we must mention that only 3% of the individual variances 
could be explained by the model tested. This means that many other determinants might play 
a role in the explanation of Swedes’ willingness to cooperate with the police.  
Although empirical evidence is found in favour of procedural justice theory in the 
Swedish context, the theory has to be tested in more countries. Tankebe (2009) has proved 
that results can differ between countries. In his study, he did not find a statistically significant 
effect of perceptions of procedurally just handling by the police on willingness to cooperate 
with the police. On the contrary, in Ghana perceptions about police effectiveness play a more 
important role. Different findings between countries could be explained by the different legal 
systems and the position of the police within those countries. Even the history of a country 
can offer an explanation. Also, the ongoing debate about the definition and operationalization 
of police legitimacy can help to explain different results. In particular, feeling the obligation 
to obey the police, which is considered to be a dimension of legitimacy in a large number of 
procedural justice studies, is not free of dispute. Some researchers argue that it is not a 
constituent of perceived legitimacy, but an outcome of perceived legitimacy. As we have 
already said, we follow Tankebe’s reasoning and argue that a possible answer to the question 
of why one should feel obliged to obey the police is that one not only believes the police are 
legitimate, but also that one is afraid if one does not obey. We have analysed two models, one 
in which moral alignment and feeling the obligation to obey are considered as antecedent and 
outcome and one in which they are both treated as dimensions of legitimacy. Both models 
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showed an equal model fit, which means that statistics cannot offer an answer to the question 
of what is actually meant by legitimacy and how it has to be measured. It is therefore a 
discussion of substance. In our approach, we believe that perceptions of legitimacy are not 
behavioural in content. We believe that one of the reasons and probably the most important 
reason why people feel an obligation to obey the police is because they believe the police act 
legally and that the police as an institution is a moral exemplar. But we also believe that there 
are other possible explanations of why a person feels an obligation to obey. Moreover, moral 
alignment or shared values as a dimension of legitimacy is also questioned. In this respect, 
Tyler et al. (in press) note: ‘Whether moral alignment is important in other countries, and 
whether it can be reasonably thought of as legitimacy, remains an open and empirical 
question’. In some societies the police are seen as a last resort. In these societies it is of less 
importance that police and citizens share the same values and norms. It is possible that the 
public supports the police even though there is no feeling of moral alignment. We therefore 
believe that moral alignment as a key notion of perceived legitimacy depends on the society. 
Furthermore, there is no consensus about how perceived police legality should be measured in 
surveys. In the ESS, the question concerning this dimension was more about perceptions of 
police corruption than about whether the police generally act according to the law. We 
therefore did not add this dimension of legitimacy to the model, although, following 
Beetham’s definition of legitimacy, we do consider it to be a dimension of legitimacy. Some 
researchers also consider trust in the police as a constituent of legitimacy. Here, we followed 
the reasoning of Hough, Jackson and their colleagues, who see trust in police procedural 
justice and in police effectiveness more as antecedents of perceived legitimacy. In this 
respect, we believe that trust in police functioning contributes to whether the police are 
perceived as legitimate. Considering all these different approaches, we hope to have made a 
contribution to the ongoing discussion about the concept of legitimacy. What is legitimacy? Is 
there a correct answer to this question? Regarding this discussion, we believe that the answer 
changes from society to society. In this respect, we believe that moral alignment and legality 
can be seen as constituents of legitimacy in a democratic society like Sweden.  
 The findings of our study could also be affected by how cooperation with the police is 
operationalized in the ESS. Tyler and Fagan (2008) identified two different forms of 
cooperation with the police. The first can be seen as ‘one-way’ cooperation (i.e. from the 
public to the police). As an example, citizens cooperate with the police when they help in 
solving specific crimes, for example by reporting a crime. The second form of cooperation 
was called cooperation with neighbours in the study, but it can be seen as a ‘partnership’ 
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between police and public if we look at the questions asked in the study, namely: how likely 
are you to volunteer time to help the police, to patrol the streets with others and to attend 
community police meetings about crime? Police and citizens are therefore working together to 
solve problems that occur within society. In the ESS only the willingness to take part in the 
first form of cooperation was measured. It is possible that other results will be found when the 
second form of cooperation is taken into account. This is because citizens will experience 
direct benefits, such as the protection of their own homes, from this partnership. Future 
studies must consider eventualities like these. 
 To end, we want to acknowledge a methodological point about the discussion, 
namely the cross-sectional nature of the survey. This means that the results cannot be 
interpreted in terms of causal relationships. What is more, if respondents reported that they 
would be willing to cooperate with the police in the future, they will not necessarily do so in 
reality. A survey contains subjective data. Whether or not people cooperate with the police in 
real life can only be verified by collecting objective data, for example by making observations 
in a police setting. 
 Although some critical comments are made, this study has shown the importance of 
trust in police procedural justice in explaining the attitude of Swedish people towards the 
police. Empirical support is found for procedural justice theory in the Swedish context.     
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Appendix 
Table  Background characteristics of the Swedish sample  
 N Min. Max. Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Immigrant background 1500 .00 1.00 .8033 .39761 
Educational level 1489 .00 1.00 .2189 .41367 
Gender recoded 1500 .00 1.00 .4800 .49977 
Age of respondent, calculated 1499 15 95 48.64 19.247 
Effectiveness of police 1398 .00 30.00 15.0057 4.87994 
Procedural fairness of police 1300 3.00 12.00 8.5992 1.35761 
Obedience to the police (legitimacy) 1419 .00 30.00 20.7519 6.29509 
Moral alignment (legitimacy) 1436 3.00 15.00 11.4241 1.69786 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
29 
 
Cooperation 1463 3.00 12.00 10.1969 1.76516 
Valid N (listwise) 1157         
 
Fig.  Results – Path model, approach of Hough, Jackson and colleagues 
Chi-square = 127.71, df = 72, p-value = 0.000, RMSEA = 0.026 
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First of all, we would like to thank the reviewers for their comments. Because of the new 
comments, we are aware that the discussion about the concept of legitimacy is still a hot issue. 
Because we believe that both reviewers have different visions about the meaning and 
conceptualization of the concept, we have tried to take the comments into account when 
possible. We hope that the quality of the article is improved.  
 
In the following we respond to the reviewers’ comments 
 
Reviewers' comments: 
 
Reviewer #1: This paper is a much revised version of an earlier submission. The authors use 
data from the 5th round of the European Social Survey (ESS) to test a key claim of Tyler's 
procedural justice model: that the legitimacy of the police is both strongly shaped by 
perceptions and experiences of, or trust in, procedural justice and in turn influences people's 
propensities to cooperate with the officers. 
 
The paper is a very significant improvement on the earlier submission. Rather than list issues 
that the authors addressed (and which they outline in their detailed response to reviewers), I 
will confine my comments to one or two outstanding issues. 
 
Most importantly, the paper is now situated such that it addresses very clearly an interesting 
debate in procedural justice theory, namely, the definition of 'empirical' legitimacy. While the 
authors support the claim made by Jackson, Hough and colleagues that 'moral alignment' is a 
key aspect of legitimacy, they also concur with Tankebe that 'obligation to obey' should be 
seen as an 'outcome' of legitimacy. This latter position seems to be based largely on the claim 
that people may feel an 'obligation' to obey authorities not because they feel them to be 
legitimate but for some reason, most notably fear of the consequences of disobedience. 
 
While this debate is on-going, there are a number of points the authors might like to consider 
that could enable their paper to better address this debate. First, a concept of legitimate that 
does not concern itself with duty, obedience and the expressed consent of the governed could, 
in many ways, be considered rather problematic. Could the authors say a little more about 
why they think these notions can be satisfactorily removed from the core concept and 
relegated to a secondary effect of it? I think there needs to be a more robust justification that 
simply a concern about the way people may answer survey questions. 
 
Second, the ESS questionnaire notes that reviewers were given an instruction in relation to 
Authors' Response to Reviewers' Comments
the 'obligation to obey' questions, which actually use the (English) word duty: if an 
interviewee were to query the meaning of 'duty', they were to reply 'Duty' in the sense of a 
citizen's moral duty to the state'. More broadly, the idea of duty is wrapped up moral and 
legal obligation or commitment. Do the authors think this definition of duty obviates the 
concerns of Tankebe, and if not, why not? This is of course a particularly interesting question 
given their emphasis on local particularity - how might these things play out in Sweden? Are 
there translation issues involved? 
 
Thank you for these relevant comments. First of all we want to point out the fact that the main 
aim of this article is to test procedural justice theory in the Swedish context. But, after we got 
the first comments on the article, we had to conclude that both reviewers have a different view 
about the meaning and conceptualization of the concept of legitimacy. That’s why it seemed 
interesting to sketch out the discussion, without going into details. In the article we have 
shown different views. We believe that these are differences in interpretation. We follow 
Tankebe’s argument that ‘obligation to obey’ theoretically differs from legitimacy. Why 
should one obey the police? The answer can be because somebody feels morally aligned with 
the police, but also because he or she is afraid of the costs of non-obedience or a feeling of 
powerlessness,… The fact that there was an instruction for the interviewers to clarify the 
meaning of ‘duty’ as ‘duty’ in the sense of citizens’ moral duty to the state, can counter 
Tankebe’s argument, but it is too weak. In such a long questionnaire, not everyone will have 
asked to clarify ‘duty’. If we only look at the question about ‘obligation to obey’, which is 
translated good in the Swedish questionnaire, we do have to take Tankebe’s argument into 
account. So, we believe that when citizens perceive the police as legitimate, they will have a 
stronger feeling of obligation to obey the police. That is also the reason why ‘obligation to 
obey’ is not taken into account as a dimension of legitimacy in our approach, but as an 
outcome. This brings us back to the whole discussion: What is the meaning of legitimacy? 
How do we have to measure legitimacy? Which dimensions are necessary? There are different 
views in content. There needs to be done more empirical research, such as longitudinal 
research (panel studies), qualitative in depth-interviews to learn more about how citizens 
define legitimacy and so on.  
We have inserted a footnote in the article about this.   
 
Third, in the SEM shown in the Appendix we find a relatively strong direct path between trust 
in police procedural fairness and obligation to obey, but no significant link between the latter 
and trust in police effectiveness. Does this affect the face validity of the claim that obligation 
to obey might be influenced by fear of the consequences of disobedience? If this is the case, 
why should trust in police fairness by so strongly associated with obligation, yet effectiveness 
(which might be read as 'ability to enforce commands') have no association with obligation? 
 
The SEM model in the appendix can be seen as extra information. Expanding on this in the 
article, would lead us too far. But, in the discussion part we say that we have analysed two 
models, one in which moral alignment and feeling the obligation to obey are considered as 
antecedent and outcome and one in which they are both treated as dimensions of legitimacy. 
Both models showed an equal model fit, which means that statistics can’t offer an answer to 
the question what the meaning of legitimacy actually is and how it has to be measured. It is a 
discussion in substance. That is the point we want to make in the article by showing the SEM 
in the appendix.  
But, for this specific comment we want to remark that these results are specific for Sweden. It 
is possible that in other countries an effect exists of trust in the effectiveness of the police on 
obligation to obey. Just saying that Tankebe’s argument can be countered because no effect 
was found of trust in the effectiveness of the police on obligation to obey, is wrong. We did 
not argue that obligation can’t be a moral obligation. It can, and in Sweden we believe that 
one’s feeling to obey the police most of the time is based on a moral ground. This can explain 
the strong direct effect of trust in procedural justice on obligation to obey. But, feeling the 
obligation to obey can also be affected by one’s fear when not obeying or a feeling of 
powerlessness. This is not the same as trust in the effectiveness of the police. Further 
empirical research, in which fear and other possible determinants are questioned, can give us 
more insight in this discussion. Also in depth interviews with citizens could offer some more 
information of why people feel obligated to obey the police or how they understand the 
question wording in the ESS.  
 
Fourth, another interpretation of the model the authors present in the main text is that it 
positions police legitimacy as a process, within which moral alignment shapes obligation to 
obey, but retains the idea that both are components of legitimacy. This seems to me an 
interesting and appealing 'middle way' in the debate, and something that could be expanded 
on in the current paper. 
 
This comment is related to the comments above. We hope that we have clarified why we 
considered obligation to obey as an outcome and not as a constituent of the concept of 
legitimacy. We believe that perceptions of legitimacy are not behavioural in content. People 
perceive the police as legitimate when they believe the police act legal and when they believe 
the police are a moral exemplar. We believe that this could be an important reason (and 
probably the most important one) why people feel an obligation to obey the police. We 
expanded a bit on it in the paper.  
 
My other outstanding concern with the paper is the dismissal of the ESS 'legality' question, 
which refers to police taking bribes. I'm not sure it is justified to claim that this is not a 
measure of legality (p.16), unless it is the case that it is legal for police to take bribes (or, at 
least, people think it is legal)! Since this seems highly unlikely, I would have thought this 
question could indeed be used in the analysis (it is, moreover, more apposite than at least one 
of the questions used by Tankebe - 'the law represents the moral values of people like me' - 
which  does not even refer to police actions, or indeed to the police at all). An interesting 
debate here, of course, is the extent to which people think the police merely enforce the law, 
or engage in the much wider activity of 'policing', which in the UK at least can involve using 
their discretion to ignore illegal activity. If citizens are more in tune with this later conception 
it would imply the rules the 
police need to follow are not merely, or even most importantly, 'the law', but are more specific 
to police and policing activity. Again, I would be interested to hear the author's views on this 
issue in the Swedish context. 
 
We believe that the question in the ESS refers to the level of corruption of the police. It is not 
because people believe the police are not corrupt that they also believe that the police always 
act according to the law. Taking bribes is only one aspect of non-legal behaviour. We believe 
that to measure perceptions of legality, some more items are needed. But we also understand 
the argument of the reviewer that Tankebe’s measurement of lawfulness is not better. We 
therefore deleted the following sentence: In this respect, we believe that Tankebe (2013) used 
a better operationalization in his study
1
. We believe that future research has to focus on the 
measurement of legality. Off course, one of the questions can be about bribes, but not all of 
them. The question used by Tankebe ‘When the police deal with people in my 
neighbourhood, they always behave according to the law’ can possibly be a good item too.  
 
Reviewer #2: The paper under publication consideration, entitled "Why do Swedes Cooperate 
with the Police?", has certainly improved during the revision process. I believe the analysis is 
much more straightforward and aligned with ongoing theoretical debate. However, the paper 
is still too lengthy and requires significant copy editing. Here are some thoughts regarding 
further revisions. 
 
First, the abstract is too long. Please revise. Make it brief and to the point. 
 
As the reviewer suggested, we revised the abstract.  
 
Second, "The concept of 'legitimacy'" section is good. Toward the end of this section the 
authors should focus on how these two population models inform their model. A sharp 
discussion on this matter needs to be presented. (NOTE: Using different variable names in 
Figures 1, 2, and 3 is confusing. Why not use the same names?) 
 
The paragraph ‘the concept of legitimacy’ is already very long and the discussion isn’t the 
mean focus of this article. But we think it is very important to sketch it out. We believe that it 
is clear why we take Tankebe’s argument into account  namely that obligation to obey is an 
outcome. We also added a footnote in this paragraph. We also believe that it is clear why we 
believe that perceptions about effectiveness and procedural justice are components of trust. In 
the discussion part some extra information about this is added. And also in the discussion part 
a whole paragraph is related to this discussion about the concept of legitimacy.  
We did not used the same variable names in the figures because Tankebe doesn’t consider 
perceptions about police effectiveness and procedural justice as elements of trust, but as 
shared values. Hough and his colleagues and we do see these as dimensions of trust. It is also 
                                                          
1
 In his study, perceived police lawfulness or legality was assessed using a two-item scale. People were asked to 
indicate how strongly they agreed with the following questions: ‘When the police deal with people in my 
neighbourhood, they always behave according to the law’ and ‘The law represents the moral values of people 
like me’.   
 
to point out the different views about the concepts. We did change lawfulness into legality 
because this can be considered as the same variable.  
 
Third, the "Recent studies" section is unnecessary. The major findings reported here were 
reported earlier in the paper. This section should be dropped, which will make the paper 
shorter. 
 
We have written this paragraph because in the first comments one of the reviewers asked to 
write a paragraph on it. That is why we didn’t delete this paragraph. We also believe this 
paragraph has an added value because this article is about the role of procedural justice in the 
explanation of people their willingness to cooperate with the police.  
 
Fourth, I would rename the section "Testable path model ...." to "Current Focus." Also, the 
presented hypotheses are not very clean. In fact, all three contain a subhypothesis related to 
the primary hypothesis. This will confuse the reader. Present hypothesis 1, for examples, and 
then presented the related hypothesis (1a). So, 
 
H1: Procedural justice is positively and significantly associated with moral alignment. 
 
H1a: Relative to police effectiveness, the effect of procedural justice on moral alignment will 
be stronger. 
 
This approach is much easier to follow. 
 
As the reviewer suggested, we changed the title into ‘Current focus’. We also changed the 
way to present our hypotheses, we hope that it is now much clearer.  
 
Fifth, I still do not understand the need to use "trust in" the variable names for procedural 
justice and effectiveness. This seems unnecessary. 
 
This is because the different approach. We consider effectiveness and procedural justice as 
dimensions of trust. That is why we use trust. It is again related to the different approaches 
that exist.  
 
Sixth, why is it necessary to restate the hypotheses in the Results section? It's not. Please 
consider removing them from this section. 
 
As the reviewer suggested, we chopped the hypotheses in the results section.  
 
Seventh, the paper falls apart on page 29. Please rewrite this section for clarity. 
 
We are not sure what the reviewer means by this comment. We have read page 29 a couple of 
times. We think that this comment is based on the fact that the first part of the 
conclusion/discussion is a discussion in substance. That is why we added that we also want to 
acknowledge a methodological point of discussion. We hope that it is now more clearer. 
 
Eighth, EJCPR recently published a procedural justice paper (see Online First articles) that 
should be included in the literature review.  
 
We have read the article the reviewer suggested and we have referred to it in our article.  
 
Overall, the paper is much improved. With a little more work (see above), I believe it will be a 
valuable contribution to the literature. 
 
Thank you for this positive note.  
  
__ 
